Wtf: Houthis, a Yemen militant group say they want direct War with American and Israeli…. Yemen forces still attacking ships in the seas, 3 attacked…
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Folks dont realize how piss poor our leadership is,
They let in all these folks through the borders.. even groups of chinese muthafuckas
came through.. bruh they allowed arabs to own stores in the hood, with loans and grants,
not privy to True Americans aka Kniggas... just so they can take money OUT of our areas, immediately
out of circulation. this was all by design by the way...
but Karma has a way of always showing up... All these Arabs they allowed into are hoods are from YEMEN...
they are HERE, you dont think they STILL HAVE CONNECTIONS TO THEIR HOMELAND... HA!!
easy recruiting... and they know where all the SINOGOGS are at... yea I spelled it right, fuck what ya heard!!!
Im just going to leave it at that... jews turned their roach problem into a snake problem....and its NOT getting better for them..
let them Keep trying to lowkey PHASE OUT REAL KNIGGAS....!!!
WATCH HOW FAST THE UNIVERSE RIDS OF OF THEIR WEAK GENETICS WHICH THEY DID TO THEMSELVES WITH ALL
THAT FUCKIN INBREEDING but thats another topic fo another time...
I aint hatin facts just debatin fact!!
They let in all these folks through the borders.. even groups of chinese muthafuckas
came through.. bruh they allowed arabs to own stores in the hood, with loans and grants,
not privy to True Americans aka Kniggas... just so they can take money OUT of our areas, immediately
out of circulation. this was all by design by the way...
but Karma has a way of always showing up... All these Arabs they allowed into are hoods are from YEMEN...
they are HERE, you dont think they STILL HAVE CONNECTIONS TO THEIR HOMELAND... HA!!
easy recruiting... and they know where all the SINOGOGS are at... yea I spelled it right, fuck what ya heard!!!
Im just going to leave it at that... jews turned their roach problem into a snake problem....and its NOT getting better for them..
let them Keep trying to lowkey PHASE OUT REAL KNIGGAS....!!!
WATCH HOW FAST THE UNIVERSE RIDS OF OF THEIR WEAK GENETICS WHICH THEY DID TO THEMSELVES WITH ALL
THAT FUCKIN INBREEDING but thats another topic fo another time...
I aint hatin facts just debatin fact!!
And like idiots we will respond and waste some more money in the Middle East. How many wars/conflicts are we supporting now? Niggas can't get no free health care, no free college, but the war budget keeps going up.
This is the real "they want all of the smoke."
Nah...that's the white man...Arabs have been fighting each other or somebody else nonstop for 5000 years.
Calling out Israeli and America after you causing issues to the shipping lanes
They have had 300,000 Yemenis killed over the last 10 years by the Saudis, cholera spreading like crazy through their population, and all they want to do is spend money on weapons and look for people to fight.
They don't give a single fuck their people. Not one.
The United States is the main one supporting the war against the Yemenis, though. Who do think gave the Saudis the weapons? The White man. Who is really fueling the war? The White Man.
Regardless, there is no law saying they can't use their resources to help their people. And it still doesn't change the fact that one group of Muslims is committing at war with another. Just like the last 5000 years.
I know some of you cats worship Arabs and Muslims, but they are who they are.
The White man is fueling the war, point blank. The United States is doing it and directing it with its funding, those are the facts. & you don't want to face facts. You just want to defend White Supremacy so you keep doing you and & pretend that United States plays no part in this.
If I sell you a gun and you shoot your mother in the face with it, are you the murderer?
Saudi Arabia is BUYING weapons. To use on muslims. White people don't give a single fuck about Yemenis. So no, the US isn't in some conspiracy to have a proxy war with Yemen. They don't care if Yemen exists or not. And if Saudi Arabia kills them all, white people don't care about that either.
Saudi Arabia doesn't want any Iranian backed government on its borders, so it's buying weapons to eliminate them.
You should probably do more research beyond Tiktok and the sites in your bubble before you serve your beloved Arabs so completely.
You must be naive, Saudi Arabia has done he bidding of the United States since its inception; they are a tool of the United States. The Saudis would not be bombing Yemen without the approval the United States.
Wake Up, bruh!
In all honesty, this is just a war between all the pale faces. Modern-day Arabs vs new Jews, modern-day Arabs vs White America. Both sides are Euro-trash muthafuckaz and I would hope not that many brothaz are gonna be sent for that war if America accepts. Don't forget for a second these Arabs are nothing more than Turks who have raped and genocided the black outta that blood line.
You need to research how long the differing religions have been at war in the middle East. A thousand years before the United States even existed. So did the US go back in time to start the wars? The the US go back in time to make these two religions hate each other?
The US plays them against each other and all other kinds of fucked up shit.
But you really need to look up the history of animosity between Shia and Sunni muslims. They have been fighting since Muhammed's death.
No sense in going back and forth until you educate yourself.
Stick to facts, there is no thousand years war and all that: Saudi Arabian didn't even exist back then.....so stop it:
Here are some facts:
csis.org
U.S. Support for Saudi Military Operations in Yemen
8–10 minutes
Since 2015, the United States has provided intelligence, military advice, and logistical support to the Saudi Arabia–led military intervention in Yemen. U.S. stated goals for this assistance are to restore the UN-recognized government of Yemen and preserve Saudi territorial integrity from incursion by Yemen-based Houthi rebels. Deepening Iranian support for the Houthi rebels has also reinforced U.S. concern for Yemen’s trajectory.
However, the Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen have led to civilian casualties and collateral damage prompting concerns from the international humanitarian community and U.S. Congress. These concerns highlight how the unintended effects of the coalition’s operations have exacerbated the terrible conditions of Yemen’s civil war, characterized as the “worst humanitarian disaster” in nearly 50 years. Recent congressional and administration debate surrounding U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has raised important questions and implications about how the United States increasingly relies on partners to achieve common security objectives in complex operating environments.
Q1: How is the United States currently supporting Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in their efforts in Yemen?
A1: The majority of U.S. assistance has consisted of aerial targeting assistance, intelligence sharing, and mid-flight aerial refueling for Saudi and UAE aircraft. Despite significant criticism of its involvement in the conflict, the U.S. government repeatedly has emphasized that assistance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not directly combat related except when in defense of U.S. forces and in the pursuit of al Qaeda and its associates. Although U.S. advisers reportedly do not approve or execute bombing targets, they do advise their Gulf partners on intelligence sharing, targeting procedures, and—after widespread condemnation of civilian casualties caused by Saudi aerial bombardment—targeting precision. In a March 14 letter to Congress, Secretary of Defense James Mattis underscored that U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition is focused on improving coalition processes and procedures, especially emphasizing the laws of armed conflict and best practices for reducing civilian casualties. Mattis cited, “limited U.S. military support of coalition forces engaging in operations in the legitimate exercise of self-defense” as the further justification for U.S. support. The United States also has recently assisted Saudi Arabia in updating Patriot missile defense systems to address missile threats from the Houthis against Saudi territory.
During his Senate Armed Services Committee testimony on March 9, General Joseph Votel reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia, stating that U.S.-backed initiatives are intended to reduce civilian casualties and enhance the effectiveness of the overall campaign. He was, however, met with criticism from some committee members, who apportioned blame to the United States for being “ complicit ” in the heavy-handed military campaign.
The debate surrounding the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen is not new. Last year, Congress held a contentious vote on continued arms sales of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia, worth $510 million, which came down to a 53-47 vote in favor of the sales. Despite the narrow vote, U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states such as the UAE are likely to continue, as highlighted during President Trump’s March 20 meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman.
Q2: How would the proposed legislation have affected U.S. support for the effort in Yemen?
A2: A joint resolution introduced in the Senate in late February would have removed “United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization of the use of force has been enacted.” Although the overall Senate blocked the resolution on March 20, the initiative raised important questions about U.S. support for the Saudi intervention in Yemen. If enacted, this move would have effectively ceased assistance to the Saudi-led coalition’s pursuit of the Houthi rebels. In his letter to Congress, Secretary Mattis warned that restrictions on U.S. military support could have the opposite of the intended effect of increasing civilian casualties, undermine counterterrorism efforts, and reduce U.S. influence with Saudi Arabia, thereby impairing U.S. and international ability to ameliorate humanitarian suffering and mitigate the effects of the civil war.
This development follows a bill passed by the house in November 2017, which called for specific legislation on the Yemen humanitarian crisis and specific congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force.
Q3: How could this proposed legislation impact U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia?
A3: The passage of restrictions on U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition would almost certainly have a markedly negative impact on U.S.-Saudi relations, as well as with the UAE. The debate surrounding the proposed legislation was raised in parallel to Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the United States, a source of tension for the Trump administration. Officials from the Departments of Defense and State met with senators in a classified briefing on Capitol Hill, warning them of the implications of the proposed legislation on the conflict in Yemen and on U.S.-Saudi relations.
Q4: What alternate measures to those outlined in the proposed legislation can the United States take to temper the unintended effects of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen?
A4: Though the questions and concerns raised by critics of the Saudi-led operations in Yemen are valid and vital, cutting off all U.S. assistance may not be the best solution to the crisis. The United States should consider alternative methods to mitigate civilian casualties and alter Saudi and wider coalition behavior in the conflict that may achieve more enduring results.
Following the international outcry against Saudi Arabia’s aerial campaign in Yemen last year, Saudi Arabia reportedly invested $750 million in a training program through the U.S. military in helping mitigate civilian casualties. The United States may consider apportioning a greater percentage of its assistance portfolio to trainings such as these, as well as combined scenario-based planning and exercises for its security partners navigating complex civil-military environments. As another alternative, the United States could link new assistance to Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners in Yemen on positive steps taken to improve humanitarian access and its civilian harm mitigation strategies. On the punitive side, the United States could halt its assistance if the Saudi-led coalition implements another blockade of Yemen or engages in disproportionate kinetic responses that harm civilians, making clear to the coalition through diplomatic and military channels where these red lines exist. With increased congressional interest in improved oversight and accountability of security sector assistance, initiatives that hold Saudi Arabia and other Gulf coalition members to higher standards of conduct in the use of force, without exacerbating the crisis in Yemen or broader regional relationships, may be feasible and impactful alternatives to the proposed legislation on Capitol Hill.
Melissa G. Dalton is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program and director of the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Hijab Shah is a research associate and Timothy Robbins is an intern with the CSIS International Security Program.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Your own article states the US has a supporting role and isn't guiding the war lmao. So no, Saudi Arabia isn't bombing Yemen because the US wants them to.
"Five years ago today, Yemen became a new front in the “Middle East Cold War” when a Saudi-led coalition intervened to restore President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. Hadi, who took over the presidency after longtime authoritarian leader Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced out during the Arab Spring, had fled to Saudi Arabia in late March 2015 following a months-long takeover of the Yemeni capital of Sana’a by Ansar Allah, a Shia militia supported by Iran and known widely as the Houthis.
Hadi remains in Saudi Arabia, and a coalition including Saudi and the UAE have failed to defeat the Houthis. The conflict has led to a humanitarian disaster, the persistence of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and over 100,000 casualties.
The international dimension in Yemen mirrors other civil wars—about 60 percent of which experience third-party interventions that often worsen the fighting. In proxy wars, states arm and support actors in another country to achieve their broader geopolitical goals, while only engaging in a small portion of on-the-ground fighting themselves. Proxy wars can backfire if ideological and strategic disconnects arise between patrons and clients, but they remain a tool of statecraft for their relatively low cost and because patrons can deny involvement.
Today, a complex web of “proxy relationships” fuel Yemen’s war—from the UAE’s support of separatists in the south, to Saudi Arabia’s support for Hadi’s faltering ground forces, and Iran’s covert assistance to the Houthis, who made recent gains in central Yemen as UN-brokered negotiations falter. These countries’ loyalties and aims have shifted over time, depending on their evolving security and political interests.
What do these regional powers want in Yemen?
The UAE has largely diverged from the Saudi-led coalition’s anti-Houthi war in northern Yemen and is “in it to win it” to secure southern Yemen. There, its leadership has supported the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a governing entity that seeks an autonomous South Yemen along pre-1990 borders and whose leadership shares the UAE’s worldview of apolitical Islam. This is crucial for Emirati officials, who perceive jihadists such as AQAP and Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood as existential threats. To defeat these strategic threats and generate lasting influence, the UAE has equipped and trained a 90,000-strong security force across the southern port city of Aden and other southern governorates.
The UAE’s patronage of the STC has caused immense tension within the coalition, which culminated in the STC’s seizure of Aden from Hadi’s government last August. Following a power-sharing agreement between Hadi and the STC brokered by Saudi Arabia in November 2019, the STC has achieved what Tyrone Groh terms “the political legitimacy and capacity” crucial to an “in it to win it” intervention strategy. Despite retrenching its own 3,500 soldiers earlier this year, the UAE’s influence remains strong via the STC and its security network.
Saudi Arabia launched the 2015 intervention with the assumption that restoring the pre-war status quo of a Hadi presidency would only take a week. Instead, it has become stuck in a holding pattern, backing Hadi in an unwinnable war. Militarily, its 20,000 air raids have failed to defeat the Houthis and exacerbated a crippling humanitarian situation. Moreover, these strikes have done little to advance the broader Saudi strategic goal of a pliant Yemen from which material threats cannot diffuse. Politically, the Saudis “continue to back what appears to be the weaker side,” as Barbara Walter and Kenneth Pollack observed in January 2015. President Hadi lacks the monopolization of force and control in Yemen and rests his future on international recognition. Although the Saudis have initiated direct talks with the Houthis that accelerated last November, they remain strategically committed to President Hadi and his unpopular and ineffective government.
Iran is feeding the chaos in Yemen in order to prolong the conflict to the detriment of its adversaries. Unlike the UAE’s apprehension with political Islam and the Saudis’ concern over Houthi hegemony, Iranian leaders face few vital threats in Yemen. The Houthis, while not part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” nevertheless offer a prime opportunity to bog down and bleed the Saudis. Militarily, Iran began smuggling small arms into Yemen in 2014, ballistic missiles by 2017, and aerial and water-borne drones by 2018, as the United Nations reports. From a political standpoint, Iran has been the only state to host an official Houthi envoy. Though the Houthis are not under the command-and-control of Iran, their ability to hold northern Yemen and carry out drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia offers Tehran the opportunity to sustain a chaotic Yemen to Saudi’s material and reputational detriment.
Ultimately, the UAE has exhibited an effective counterterrorism and patronage strategy that has entrenched its influence in the STC stronghold of Aden. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has revealed the limits that patrons often face in achieving their strategic goals via local proxies. Despite his legitimacy in the halls of the UN, President Hadi marshals little sovereignty in Yemen itself. Finally, Iran demonstrates how covertly feeding the chaos by arming the Houthis has prolonged the conflict to economically and politically drain Saudi Arabia and other interveners with more skin in the game.
Five years of war have accentuated the futility of pure military resolutions to the fighting in Yemen. However, its proxy wars are likely to persist, much for the same reason they have persisted in Syria and Libya; namely, because the potential benefits to intervening states still outweigh the costs that they pay to gain control, maintain the status quo, or simply feed the chaos. "
And here is a full timeline of that conflict. This really is the last I'm going to post on this because arguing with zealots is a waste of time.
A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present
Early Years: Saleh and the Houthis 1990’s – After the reunification of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh transitions from president of North Yemen—a post he had held since 1978—to president of the Republic of Yemen. At the same time, the Zaidi-Shia group Ansar Allah—or the Houthis—gradually gain power...
arabcenterdc.org
Big Tex, I guess you don't know how this works, in Vietnam the United States played a supporting role by sending military advisers but who was really directing the war, THE UNITED STATES.Your own article states the US has a supporting role and isn't guiding the war lmao. So no, Saudi Arabia isn't bombing Yemen because the US wants them to.
"Five years ago today, Yemen became a new front in the “Middle East Cold War” when a Saudi-led coalition intervened to restore President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. Hadi, who took over the presidency after longtime authoritarian leader Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced out during the Arab Spring, had fled to Saudi Arabia in late March 2015 following a months-long takeover of the Yemeni capital of Sana’a by Ansar Allah, a Shia militia supported by Iran and known widely as the Houthis.
Hadi remains in Saudi Arabia, and a coalition including Saudi and the UAE have failed to defeat the Houthis. The conflict has led to a humanitarian disaster, the persistence of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and over 100,000 casualties.
The international dimension in Yemen mirrors other civil wars—about 60 percent of which experience third-party interventions that often worsen the fighting. In proxy wars, states arm and support actors in another country to achieve their broader geopolitical goals, while only engaging in a small portion of on-the-ground fighting themselves. Proxy wars can backfire if ideological and strategic disconnects arise between patrons and clients, but they remain a tool of statecraft for their relatively low cost and because patrons can deny involvement.
Today, a complex web of “proxy relationships” fuel Yemen’s war—from the UAE’s support of separatists in the south, to Saudi Arabia’s support for Hadi’s faltering ground forces, and Iran’s covert assistance to the Houthis, who made recent gains in central Yemen as UN-brokered negotiations falter. These countries’ loyalties and aims have shifted over time, depending on their evolving security and political interests.
What do these regional powers want in Yemen?
The UAE has largely diverged from the Saudi-led coalition’s anti-Houthi war in northern Yemen and is “in it to win it” to secure southern Yemen. There, its leadership has supported the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a governing entity that seeks an autonomous South Yemen along pre-1990 borders and whose leadership shares the UAE’s worldview of apolitical Islam. This is crucial for Emirati officials, who perceive jihadists such as AQAP and Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood as existential threats. To defeat these strategic threats and generate lasting influence, the UAE has equipped and trained a 90,000-strong security force across the southern port city of Aden and other southern governorates.
The UAE’s patronage of the STC has caused immense tension within the coalition, which culminated in the STC’s seizure of Aden from Hadi’s government last August. Following a power-sharing agreement between Hadi and the STC brokered by Saudi Arabia in November 2019, the STC has achieved what Tyrone Groh terms “the political legitimacy and capacity” crucial to an “in it to win it” intervention strategy. Despite retrenching its own 3,500 soldiers earlier this year, the UAE’s influence remains strong via the STC and its security network.
Saudi Arabia launched the 2015 intervention with the assumption that restoring the pre-war status quo of a Hadi presidency would only take a week. Instead, it has become stuck in a holding pattern, backing Hadi in an unwinnable war. Militarily, its 20,000 air raids have failed to defeat the Houthis and exacerbated a crippling humanitarian situation. Moreover, these strikes have done little to advance the broader Saudi strategic goal of a pliant Yemen from which material threats cannot diffuse. Politically, the Saudis “continue to back what appears to be the weaker side,” as Barbara Walter and Kenneth Pollack observed in January 2015. President Hadi lacks the monopolization of force and control in Yemen and rests his future on international recognition. Although the Saudis have initiated direct talks with the Houthis that accelerated last November, they remain strategically committed to President Hadi and his unpopular and ineffective government.
Iran is feeding the chaos in Yemen in order to prolong the conflict to the detriment of its adversaries. Unlike the UAE’s apprehension with political Islam and the Saudis’ concern over Houthi hegemony, Iranian leaders face few vital threats in Yemen. The Houthis, while not part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” nevertheless offer a prime opportunity to bog down and bleed the Saudis. Militarily, Iran began smuggling small arms into Yemen in 2014, ballistic missiles by 2017, and aerial and water-borne drones by 2018, as the United Nations reports. From a political standpoint, Iran has been the only state to host an official Houthi envoy. Though the Houthis are not under the command-and-control of Iran, their ability to hold northern Yemen and carry out drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia offers Tehran the opportunity to sustain a chaotic Yemen to Saudi’s material and reputational detriment.
Ultimately, the UAE has exhibited an effective counterterrorism and patronage strategy that has entrenched its influence in the STC stronghold of Aden. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has revealed the limits that patrons often face in achieving their strategic goals via local proxies. Despite his legitimacy in the halls of the UN, President Hadi marshals little sovereignty in Yemen itself. Finally, Iran demonstrates how covertly feeding the chaos by arming the Houthis has prolonged the conflict to economically and politically drain Saudi Arabia and other interveners with more skin in the game.
Five years of war have accentuated the futility of pure military resolutions to the fighting in Yemen. However, its proxy wars are likely to persist, much for the same reason they have persisted in Syria and Libya; namely, because the potential benefits to intervening states still outweigh the costs that they pay to gain control, maintain the status quo, or simply feed the chaos. "
And here is a full timeline of that conflict. This really is the last I'm going to post on this because arguing with zealots is a waste of time.
A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present
Early Years: Saleh and the Houthis 1990’s – After the reunification of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh transitions from president of North Yemen—a post he had held since 1978—to president of the Republic of Yemen. At the same time, the Zaidi-Shia group Ansar Allah—or the Houthis—gradually gain power...
AND
you didn't even read the first sentence of the article I posted:
Since 2015, the United States has provided intelligence, military advice, and logistical support to the Saudi Arabia–led military intervention in Yemen.
What a disingenuous bogus article, how you can talk about the role of Iran without talking about the role of the United States directing Saudi Arabia? Huh? This article is trash.Your own article states the US has a supporting role and isn't guiding the war lmao. So no, Saudi Arabia isn't bombing Yemen because the US wants them to.
"Five years ago today, Yemen became a new front in the “Middle East Cold War” when a Saudi-led coalition intervened to restore President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. Hadi, who took over the presidency after longtime authoritarian leader Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced out during the Arab Spring, had fled to Saudi Arabia in late March 2015 following a months-long takeover of the Yemeni capital of Sana’a by Ansar Allah, a Shia militia supported by Iran and known widely as the Houthis.
Hadi remains in Saudi Arabia, and a coalition including Saudi and the UAE have failed to defeat the Houthis. The conflict has led to a humanitarian disaster, the persistence of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and over 100,000 casualties.
The international dimension in Yemen mirrors other civil wars—about 60 percent of which experience third-party interventions that often worsen the fighting. In proxy wars, states arm and support actors in another country to achieve their broader geopolitical goals, while only engaging in a small portion of on-the-ground fighting themselves. Proxy wars can backfire if ideological and strategic disconnects arise between patrons and clients, but they remain a tool of statecraft for their relatively low cost and because patrons can deny involvement.
Today, a complex web of “proxy relationships” fuel Yemen’s war—from the UAE’s support of separatists in the south, to Saudi Arabia’s support for Hadi’s faltering ground forces, and Iran’s covert assistance to the Houthis, who made recent gains in central Yemen as UN-brokered negotiations falter. These countries’ loyalties and aims have shifted over time, depending on their evolving security and political interests.
What do these regional powers want in Yemen?
The UAE has largely diverged from the Saudi-led coalition’s anti-Houthi war in northern Yemen and is “in it to win it” to secure southern Yemen. There, its leadership has supported the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a governing entity that seeks an autonomous South Yemen along pre-1990 borders and whose leadership shares the UAE’s worldview of apolitical Islam. This is crucial for Emirati officials, who perceive jihadists such as AQAP and Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood as existential threats. To defeat these strategic threats and generate lasting influence, the UAE has equipped and trained a 90,000-strong security force across the southern port city of Aden and other southern governorates.
The UAE’s patronage of the STC has caused immense tension within the coalition, which culminated in the STC’s seizure of Aden from Hadi’s government last August. Following a power-sharing agreement between Hadi and the STC brokered by Saudi Arabia in November 2019, the STC has achieved what Tyrone Groh terms “the political legitimacy and capacity” crucial to an “in it to win it” intervention strategy. Despite retrenching its own 3,500 soldiers earlier this year, the UAE’s influence remains strong via the STC and its security network.
Saudi Arabia launched the 2015 intervention with the assumption that restoring the pre-war status quo of a Hadi presidency would only take a week. Instead, it has become stuck in a holding pattern, backing Hadi in an unwinnable war. Militarily, its 20,000 air raids have failed to defeat the Houthis and exacerbated a crippling humanitarian situation. Moreover, these strikes have done little to advance the broader Saudi strategic goal of a pliant Yemen from which material threats cannot diffuse. Politically, the Saudis “continue to back what appears to be the weaker side,” as Barbara Walter and Kenneth Pollack observed in January 2015. President Hadi lacks the monopolization of force and control in Yemen and rests his future on international recognition. Although the Saudis have initiated direct talks with the Houthis that accelerated last November, they remain strategically committed to President Hadi and his unpopular and ineffective government.
Iran is feeding the chaos in Yemen in order to prolong the conflict to the detriment of its adversaries. Unlike the UAE’s apprehension with political Islam and the Saudis’ concern over Houthi hegemony, Iranian leaders face few vital threats in Yemen. The Houthis, while not part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” nevertheless offer a prime opportunity to bog down and bleed the Saudis. Militarily, Iran began smuggling small arms into Yemen in 2014, ballistic missiles by 2017, and aerial and water-borne drones by 2018, as the United Nations reports. From a political standpoint, Iran has been the only state to host an official Houthi envoy. Though the Houthis are not under the command-and-control of Iran, their ability to hold northern Yemen and carry out drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia offers Tehran the opportunity to sustain a chaotic Yemen to Saudi’s material and reputational detriment.
Ultimately, the UAE has exhibited an effective counterterrorism and patronage strategy that has entrenched its influence in the STC stronghold of Aden. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has revealed the limits that patrons often face in achieving their strategic goals via local proxies. Despite his legitimacy in the halls of the UN, President Hadi marshals little sovereignty in Yemen itself. Finally, Iran demonstrates how covertly feeding the chaos by arming the Houthis has prolonged the conflict to economically and politically drain Saudi Arabia and other interveners with more skin in the game.
Five years of war have accentuated the futility of pure military resolutions to the fighting in Yemen. However, its proxy wars are likely to persist, much for the same reason they have persisted in Syria and Libya; namely, because the potential benefits to intervening states still outweigh the costs that they pay to gain control, maintain the status quo, or simply feed the chaos. "
And here is a full timeline of that conflict. This really is the last I'm going to post on this because arguing with zealots is a waste of time.
A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present
Early Years: Saleh and the Houthis 1990’s – After the reunification of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh transitions from president of North Yemen—a post he had held since 1978—to president of the Republic of Yemen. At the same time, the Zaidi-Shia group Ansar Allah—or the Houthis—gradually gain power...
The United States supports the Yemeni war with Saudi Arabia.....
theintercept.com
Ryan Grim
8–10 minutes
Yemeni tribal figures from Abyan province wait to get their military commander freed from prison in Sanaa, Yemen, on April 30, 2023.
Photo: Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images
I’ve always thought of the famous John Lennon refrain, “War is over, if you want it,” as mostly a thought experiment meant to shake us out of the learned helplessness that can lead to forever wars. But in the case of the war in Yemen, the war really is over if we want.
Everybody else directly or indirectly involved — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Houthis, China, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, etc. — appears to want to put the war behind them. A ceasefire has held for more than a year, and peace talks are advancing with real momentum, including prisoner exchanges and other positive expressions of diplomacy. Yet the U.S. appears very much not to want the war to end; our proxies have been thumped on the battlefieldOpens in a new tab and are in a poor negotiating position as a result.
Reading between the lines, the U.S. seems to be attempting to slow-walk and blow up the peace talksOpens in a new tab. Triggering a resumption of hostilities would unleash yet another Saudi-led bombing campaign that could win U.S. proxies better terms when it comes to control of the strategically positioned Yemeni coastline. (The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden link the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean at the southwestern corner of Yemen, an area so geopolitically important to the flow of oil and international traffic that the U.S. has one of its largest bases, in Djibouti, across the strait.)
Tim Lenderking, the U.S. special envoy for Yemen, has been offering up particularly pessimistic comments on negotiations. “I don’t expect a durable resolution — and we should not — to the nearly eight-year conflict in Yemen to happen overnight,” he said recently in the regionOpens in a new tab. “A political process will take time and likely face numerous setbacks, but I continue to be optimistic that we have a real opportunity ahead of us for peace.” That sounds nice, but decoding the diplomacy, the most important remark there is the prediction of “numerous setbacks” and the confidence that we “should not” expect “a durable resolution.”
“I don’t think we’re near the finish line yet,” Lenderking went on. “I think there is great challenges ahead. I think there is still a considerable amount of distrust among the parties, and there’s considerable division within Yemen’s society itself.”
In fact, Lenderking is attempting to wish “considerable division” back into Yemeni society. Much of that considerable division has been resolved by the Houthis winning the war. But acknowledging that would give the U.S. and Saudi-backed proxies, which operated largely out of luxury hotel rooms in RiyadhOpens in a new tab, no real position in the new Yemeni government. That’s why the U.S. keeps pressing for an “inclusive government” — the same phrase the U.S. has used with Afghanistan, demanding that in order for us to release the country’s foreign currency reserves, the Taliban must empower our proxies there (the warlords the Taliban already paid off to hand the country over to them).
In mid-April, as news of the Saudi-Iran-Houthi peace deal emerged, U.S. diplomats rushed to Saudi Arabia to tap the brakes. Axios reportedOpens in a new tab at the time that the Brett McGurk, a top envoy to the region, and Lenderking “underscored the U.S. support for
Saudi Arabia’s defense against threats from Yemen or elsewhere and emphasized the need for forging broader regional integration and stability through a combination of diplomacy, deterrence, and new investment and infrastructure.” This saber rattling and talk of new security guarantees came just as hundreds of prisoners were being exchanged, and the world was celebrating the steps toward peace.
A State Department spokesperson, Vedant Patel, said that I was reading too much into the U.S. insistence on transitioning the talks over to the United Nations and making sure the deal is “comprehensive” and inclusive” before peace is reached. “I reject your premise that we’re hostile to these peace talks,” Patel said. “In fact, Tim reiterated our commitment to not just strengthening the UN brokered truce but also how we remain focused on helping the parties secure a new, more comprehensive agreement.”
But the U.S. knows that time is not on the Houthis’ side. Saudi Arabia is still inflicting a blockade on Yemen, preventing food, medical supplies, and energy from entering the country at anywhere near the capacity needed for basic survival. In Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, a charitable offering worth roughly $9 recently drew a crowd of hundreds to a local school. Houthi security forces,Opens in a new tab in a failed effort at crowd control, fired weapons in the air; a bullet reportedly hit an electrical box, sparking an explosion and a panicked stampede that left at least 78 people dead.
The Houthis, for their own political and literal survival, need the blockade lifted. If the talks drag on for too long, the Houthis are likely to resume cross-border strikes. Everybody on all sides knows that, which is why the Saudis appear eager to get to a final deal, while the U.S. keeps throwing up new conditions.
Hassan El-Tayyab, legislative director for Middle East policy for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, who has lobbied for an end to the war, said the U.S. rhetoric makes him nervous. “I’m very concerned that the administration is adding all these conditions to a full U.S. military exit and a Saudi-Houthi deal. I’m worried that they’d use the idea that we need to have a perfect inclusive peace as a precondition to lifting the blockade,” he said, adding that he is completely supportive of an inclusive peace — but the U.S. has no business dictating terms of what peace should look like. “Yemenis should be allowed to chart their own future. It increasingly seems like the Biden administration would rather slow down diplomatic progress instead of finally just ending the Saudi-Houthi conflict.”
Even if the State Department earnestly believes longer talks will produce a more durable peace, the longer the talks are delayed while the blockade remains in effect, the more likely it becomes that hostilities resume. And likelier it is that Houthis launch attacks across the border at Saudi Arabia, that Saudi Arabia responds with a devastating round of bombing — and then the U.S. proxies get a bigger chunk of Yemen in peace talks when they start up again amid the rubble.
If the U.S. wanted to reduce the risk of restarting the war, it could urge Saudi Arabia to lift the blockade without conditions, or could announce that it will not support a new round of Saudi bombing. The U.S. has resisted doing either.
On Thursday, a group of more than three dozen House Democrats sent a letter to the State Department urging the U.S. to make both of those commitments, urging U.S. diplomats to “[c]learly and publicly state that the United States will not provide any further support in any form to any faction party to the conflict while diplomatic talks to end the war are ongoing and should they fail to reach a diplomatic settlement and return to armed hostilities” and “[c]learly and publicly state that the Saudi blockade of Yemen’s ports — a form of collective punishment against innocent Yemenis — must be lifted unconditionally, as global international humanitarian leaders have long sought.”
If the U.S. did what the letter is suggesting, the war would be over. If we want it.
theintercept.com
theintercept.com
The Yemen War Can Be Over — If Biden Wants It
Ryan Grim
8–10 minutes
Yemeni tribal figures from Abyan province wait to get their military commander freed from prison in Sanaa, Yemen, on April 30, 2023.
Photo: Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images
I’ve always thought of the famous John Lennon refrain, “War is over, if you want it,” as mostly a thought experiment meant to shake us out of the learned helplessness that can lead to forever wars. But in the case of the war in Yemen, the war really is over if we want.
Everybody else directly or indirectly involved — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Houthis, China, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, etc. — appears to want to put the war behind them. A ceasefire has held for more than a year, and peace talks are advancing with real momentum, including prisoner exchanges and other positive expressions of diplomacy. Yet the U.S. appears very much not to want the war to end; our proxies have been thumped on the battlefieldOpens in a new tab and are in a poor negotiating position as a result.
Reading between the lines, the U.S. seems to be attempting to slow-walk and blow up the peace talksOpens in a new tab. Triggering a resumption of hostilities would unleash yet another Saudi-led bombing campaign that could win U.S. proxies better terms when it comes to control of the strategically positioned Yemeni coastline. (The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden link the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean at the southwestern corner of Yemen, an area so geopolitically important to the flow of oil and international traffic that the U.S. has one of its largest bases, in Djibouti, across the strait.)
Tim Lenderking, the U.S. special envoy for Yemen, has been offering up particularly pessimistic comments on negotiations. “I don’t expect a durable resolution — and we should not — to the nearly eight-year conflict in Yemen to happen overnight,” he said recently in the regionOpens in a new tab. “A political process will take time and likely face numerous setbacks, but I continue to be optimistic that we have a real opportunity ahead of us for peace.” That sounds nice, but decoding the diplomacy, the most important remark there is the prediction of “numerous setbacks” and the confidence that we “should not” expect “a durable resolution.”
“I don’t think we’re near the finish line yet,” Lenderking went on. “I think there is great challenges ahead. I think there is still a considerable amount of distrust among the parties, and there’s considerable division within Yemen’s society itself.”
In fact, Lenderking is attempting to wish “considerable division” back into Yemeni society. Much of that considerable division has been resolved by the Houthis winning the war. But acknowledging that would give the U.S. and Saudi-backed proxies, which operated largely out of luxury hotel rooms in RiyadhOpens in a new tab, no real position in the new Yemeni government. That’s why the U.S. keeps pressing for an “inclusive government” — the same phrase the U.S. has used with Afghanistan, demanding that in order for us to release the country’s foreign currency reserves, the Taliban must empower our proxies there (the warlords the Taliban already paid off to hand the country over to them).
In mid-April, as news of the Saudi-Iran-Houthi peace deal emerged, U.S. diplomats rushed to Saudi Arabia to tap the brakes. Axios reportedOpens in a new tab at the time that the Brett McGurk, a top envoy to the region, and Lenderking “underscored the U.S. support for
Saudi Arabia’s defense against threats from Yemen or elsewhere and emphasized the need for forging broader regional integration and stability through a combination of diplomacy, deterrence, and new investment and infrastructure.” This saber rattling and talk of new security guarantees came just as hundreds of prisoners were being exchanged, and the world was celebrating the steps toward peace.
A State Department spokesperson, Vedant Patel, said that I was reading too much into the U.S. insistence on transitioning the talks over to the United Nations and making sure the deal is “comprehensive” and inclusive” before peace is reached. “I reject your premise that we’re hostile to these peace talks,” Patel said. “In fact, Tim reiterated our commitment to not just strengthening the UN brokered truce but also how we remain focused on helping the parties secure a new, more comprehensive agreement.”
But the U.S. knows that time is not on the Houthis’ side. Saudi Arabia is still inflicting a blockade on Yemen, preventing food, medical supplies, and energy from entering the country at anywhere near the capacity needed for basic survival. In Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, a charitable offering worth roughly $9 recently drew a crowd of hundreds to a local school. Houthi security forces,Opens in a new tab in a failed effort at crowd control, fired weapons in the air; a bullet reportedly hit an electrical box, sparking an explosion and a panicked stampede that left at least 78 people dead.
The Houthis, for their own political and literal survival, need the blockade lifted. If the talks drag on for too long, the Houthis are likely to resume cross-border strikes. Everybody on all sides knows that, which is why the Saudis appear eager to get to a final deal, while the U.S. keeps throwing up new conditions.
Hassan El-Tayyab, legislative director for Middle East policy for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, who has lobbied for an end to the war, said the U.S. rhetoric makes him nervous. “I’m very concerned that the administration is adding all these conditions to a full U.S. military exit and a Saudi-Houthi deal. I’m worried that they’d use the idea that we need to have a perfect inclusive peace as a precondition to lifting the blockade,” he said, adding that he is completely supportive of an inclusive peace — but the U.S. has no business dictating terms of what peace should look like. “Yemenis should be allowed to chart their own future. It increasingly seems like the Biden administration would rather slow down diplomatic progress instead of finally just ending the Saudi-Houthi conflict.”
Erik Sperling, executive director of Just Foreign Policy, was even more blunt. “It’s surreal to think that the Biden administration is more hawkish on Yemen than the brutal regime of Mohammed bin Salman, but that’s the current reality,” said Sperling. “Lenderking has made clear that his primary goal is not ending the war but advancing the U.S. and Israeli anti-Iran crusade in the region. He would prefer the Saudis continue their brutal war and blockade against Yemen, even if it means endangering Saudi security, to a deal that legitimizes Yemen’s de facto authorities. The blood of Yemenis will once again be on U.S. hands if he succeeds in his goal of scuttling the Saudi-Houthi deal and the war escalates.”
Even if the State Department earnestly believes longer talks will produce a more durable peace, the longer the talks are delayed while the blockade remains in effect, the more likely it becomes that hostilities resume. And likelier it is that Houthis launch attacks across the border at Saudi Arabia, that Saudi Arabia responds with a devastating round of bombing — and then the U.S. proxies get a bigger chunk of Yemen in peace talks when they start up again amid the rubble.
If the U.S. wanted to reduce the risk of restarting the war, it could urge Saudi Arabia to lift the blockade without conditions, or could announce that it will not support a new round of Saudi bombing. The U.S. has resisted doing either.
On Thursday, a group of more than three dozen House Democrats sent a letter to the State Department urging the U.S. to make both of those commitments, urging U.S. diplomats to “[c]learly and publicly state that the United States will not provide any further support in any form to any faction party to the conflict while diplomatic talks to end the war are ongoing and should they fail to reach a diplomatic settlement and return to armed hostilities” and “[c]learly and publicly state that the Saudi blockade of Yemen’s ports — a form of collective punishment against innocent Yemenis — must be lifted unconditionally, as global international humanitarian leaders have long sought.”
If the U.S. did what the letter is suggesting, the war would be over. If we want it.
The Yemen War Can Be Over — If Biden Wants It
The U.S. is slow-walking peace negotiations, effectively pushing for a resumption of the war.
theintercept.com
I hope someone exterminates isreal expeditiously, patna!
Good way to support genocide......
She always hates on the Democrats
Smh
Smh
Oh boy
Hippies losing they shit on Twitter smh
America must PROTECT THEIR ALLIES!
America must PROTECT THEIR ALLIES!