After his release from prison, Wright obtained his undergraduate degree in 2002, entering law school in 2004 and graduating from St. Thomas University School of Law in 2007. Passing the New Jersey Bar in 2008, he spent the next nine years being investigated by the New Jersey Bar’s Committee on Character before being granted admission to the bar by the New Jersey Supreme Court on September 27, 2017.
On September 27, 2017, Wright became the only person in U.S. history to be condemned to life in prison, secure his own release and exoneration and then be granted a license to practice law by the very court that condemned him.
Wright got his 1991 conviction overturned by exposing the gross corruption and misconduct within the court that convicted him, the prosecutors office and the police force. This allowed Wright to successfully get rid of his life sentence but he remained in prison on numerous other convictions with sentences totaling over 70 years. Wright’s ultimate release came as a result of his cross-examination of veteran police detective, James Dugan. Dugan’s confession opened revelations of wide and systematic misconduct and cover-up in Wright’s case. Then Somerset County Prosecutor, Nicholas L. Bissell, Jr., who tried Wright’s case personally was fingered as being the orchestrator of that misconduct, directing police officers to falsify their police reports while he personally dictated the false testimony of witnesses against Wright and made secret deals with defense attorneys to have their clients lie to the jury that Wright was their drug boss and that they had plead guilty and were going to prison, when in-fact, they were never going to spend a day in jail.
Dugan pled guilty to official misconduct in order to escape prison. Wright’s trial judge, Michael Imbriani, was removed from the bench and sent to prison on theft charges and Bissell, after learning of Dugan’s confession on TV news, took flight with federal authorities in pursuit. As police were kicking in the door of his Las Vegas hotel room, Bissell put a revolver to his head and pulled the trigger, committing suicide. Wright’s remaining convictions were vacated and he was immediately released from prison. The charges were dropped and the case against him dismissed.
Wright now works at the Law Firm Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley located in Newark, New Jersey, and is to have said “I went to law school for one reason and one reason only, To slay giants for a price. And if the giant is big enough and the cause is important enough, I’ll do it for free, especially when it involves helping those who cannot help themselves.”
Isaac Wright v. State of New Jersey et als.
Annotate this Case SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Isaac Wright v. State of New Jersey et als. (A-54/55/56/57/58/59-2000)
Argued April 30, 2001 -- Decided July 31, 2001
STEIN, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
The issue before the Court is whether pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), the State of New Jersey is vicariously liable for the actions of the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO) employees and whether the State is required to indemnify and defend them.
In August 1989, after a lengthy investigation, Isaac Wright was indicted and charged with leading a drug trafficking network, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, maintaining or operating a narcotics production facility, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. In 1991, Wright was found guilty by a jury of all charges and was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.
In July 1991, Wright and his wife filed a civil lawsuit against the State and several law enforcement agencies and employees, including employees of the SCPO. The complaint alleged, among other things, false arrest, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and loss of consortium. Wright also alleged that defendants beat him at the time of his arrest, suborned perjury, and illegally searched his prison cell. Wright claimed that former Somerset County Prosecutor, Nicholas Bissell, Jr., and several employees of the SCPO, including Veronica Nolan (Assistant Prosecutor), Stuart Buckman (Detective), and Robert Smith (Deputy Chief of Detectives), among others, acted to effect his false arrest and invade his privacy.
In 1995, the Appellate Division affirmed all of Wright's convictions except the conviction for leading a narcotics trafficking network. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Wright subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief seeking to have the remaining convictions reversed, alleging prosecutorial and police misconduct throughout the investigation, arrest, grand jury proceedings, and trial. In December 1997, the trial court reversed Wright's remaining convictions, finding that high-ranking Somerset County law-enforcement officials concealed evidence of an illegal search and seizure of cocaine used at Wright's trial; and that Somerset County Prosecutor Bissell knew about but concealed the terms of a favorable plea agreement with one of Wright's co- defendant's, a State witness at Wright's trial. The indictment against Wright was dismissed without prejudice.
In February 1997, prior to the State's joinder in a third-amended complaint, Somerset County's request to the Attorney General (AG) that the State represent and indemnify the SCPO-employee defendants was denied. In September and October 1998, Nolan, Buckman, Smith, and other prosecutorial and municipal defendants, filed cross-claims demanding that the State provide them with indemnification and legal representation. Thereafter, the State moved for summary judgment dismissing Wright's third-amended complaint and all cross-claims demanding defense and indemnification. Nolan, Buckman, Smith, and others cross-moved for summary judgment against the State for vicarious liability, indemnification, and defense costs.
In August 1999, the trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, finding that Somerset County was liable for defense and indemnification of the SCPO employees. The court dismissed the State's motion and the cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability, declining to decide the issue because discovery was incomplete. Thereafter, the trial court denied Somerset County's request for reconsideration but amended its August 1999 order to require that indemnification and defense costs be resolved between the county and its prosecutorial employees. A month later, the trial court issued its interlocutory opinion granting summary judgment to the State on all vicarious liability claims.
The Appellate Division denied interlocutory review of both orders. Somerset County, Veronica Nolan, Stuart Buckman, and Robert Smith each filed a motion before the Supreme Court seeking reversal of each Appellate Division order denying interlocutory review, which were granted.
HELD: The State of New Jersey may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the Somerset County Prosecutor's office prosecutors and investigative subordinates during the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Isaac Wright and the State may be required to indemnify and defend those prosecutors and subordinates in respect of the claims alleged by Wright in his civil action.
1. Under the TCA, a public entity is vicariously liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee acting within the scope of his or her employment. A public entity's liability under the TCA flows from the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is based on the control of the master over the servant. Under the control test, a master-servant relationship exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct what and how something is to be done. (Pp. 12-16)
2. The AG has the power to supersede a county prosecutor in any investigation, criminal action, or proceeding. A county cannot be held liable for the actions of the county prosecutor and his detectives when their tortious conduct arose out of the investigation of criminal activity. Prosecutors hold a hybrid status; when they engage in classic enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State but when they are performing administrative functions, they act on behalf of the county. (Pp. 16-25)
3. The Court relies exclusively on the provisions of the TCA, as well as related case law, to resolve the defense and indemnification issue. Because the acts of the county prosecutors and their subordinates were committed within the scope of their employment, the question of defense and indemnification turns on whether the SCPO employees can be considered State employees, pursuant to the TCA. If so, the State must defend and indemnify the county employees. (Pp. 26-36)
4. The control test is neither dispositive nor persuasive on the issue of the State's vicarious liability. Rather, the Court relies on statutory interpretation and relevant case law related to the vicarious liability provisions of the TCA. County prosecutors and their subordinates act as agents or officers of the State when investigating criminal activity and enforcing the law. No further discovery is necessary to determine that all of Wright's causes of action clearly relate exclusively to the county prosecutors' investigation and enforcement of the criminal laws of the State. (Pp. 36-39)
5. Because law enforcement is a basic State function, and because county prosecutors are uniquely subject at all times to the AG's statutory power to supervise and supersede them, it is appropriate and consonant with legislative intent to construe the vicarious liability provisions of the TCA as imposing vicarious liability on the State for the tortious actions of county prosecutorial employees in the performance of their law enforcement duties. Moreover, case law provides that a county cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of prosecutorial defendants related to the investigation and enforcement of the criminal laws of the State. (Pp. 39-41)
6. Because of their hybrid status, the focus of the determination of whether the county prosecutorial employees should be State employees within the meaning of the defense and indemnification provisions of the TCA should be on whether the function that these prosecutorial employees were performing during the alleged wrongdoing is a function that has been understood to be a State function subject to State supervision in its execution. When county prosecutors are involved in the investigation and enforcement of the State's criminal laws, they perform a function that has traditionally been the responsibility of the State for which the AG is ultimately responsible. (Pp. 41-45)
7. The statutory language in the TCA did not take into account the unique role of county prosecutorial employees, who are paid by the county, but who perform a State law-enforcement function under State supervisory authority. To vindicate the legislative purpose of providing defense and indemnification to public employees performing an essential State function, the defense and indemnification provisions of the TCA are interpreted to apply to county prosecutorial employees sued on the basis of actions taken in the discharge of their law enforcement duties. (Pp. 45-48)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE SKILLMAN, temporarily assigned, dissents, noting that the Legislature has mandated that each county bear the financial responsibility for operation of the county prosecutor's office; thus, the obligation to pay for the defense and indemnification of prosecutorial employees should rest within the county unless the TCA contains a clear and unequivocal expression of a contrary legislative intent. Judge Skillman does not find that the TCA reflects such legislative intent.
JUSTICES COLEMAN and LONG, and APPELLATE DIVISION JUDGE PRESSLER, temporarily assigned, join in JUSTICE STEIN'S opinion. APPELLATE DIVISION JUDGE SKILLMAN, temporarily assigned, filed a separate dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES VERNIERO, LAVECCHIA and ZAZZALI did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-54/55/56/57/58/59
September Term 2000
ISAAC WRIGHT, ADRIEL McNAIR, A/K/A SUNSHINE WRIGHT and SANDRA WRIGHT, guardian for TIKEALLA WRIGHT, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF SOMERSET COUNTY; THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY; THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF PASSAIC COUNTY; MIDDLESEX COUNTY, NJ; PASSAIC COUNTY, NJ; FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP, NJ; EDISON TOWNSHIP, NJ; PASSAIC CITY, NJ; BARBARA J. BISSELL, EXECUTRIX of the Estate of NICHOLAS L. BISSELL, JR.; PETER DEMARCO, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD THORNBURG, individually and in his official capacity; ANDREW RACZ, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD A. MYERS, individually and in his official capacity; JAMES DUGAN, individually and in his official capacity; SCOTT FABIANO, individually and in his official capacity; RUSSELL KINGSLAND, individually and in his official capacity; LINDA WISHART, individually and in her official capacity; SAM DEBELLA, individually and in his official capacity; TIMOTHY WENZEL, individually and in his official capacity;
NANCY DONALON, individually and in her official capacity; RONALD KUSHNER, individually and in his official capacity; JOSEPH KRIZA, individually and in his official capacity; KEN EUBER, individually and in his official capacity; THOMAS MALTESE, individually and in his official capacity; CHRIS INGRAM, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN ZANKOWICK, individually and in his official capacity; LOUIS KIRSH, individually and in his official capacity; JAMES FERGUSON, individually and in his official capacity; JOSEPH LOMBARDO, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN KENNY, individually and in his official capacity; JOSEPH FEZZA, individually and in his official capacity; OTIS DANIELS, individually and in his official capacity; JOHN CARAVANNA, individually and in his official capacity; RICHARD HURLEY; TERRENCE D. DZURA; MICHAEL R. IMBRIANI, individually and in his official capacity; BEN TANG; JOSEPH RHETTO; AUTO SPORT VOLVO, INC.; ACME MOTORS; JOHN DOE (S) (1-100), individually and in his official capacity; JANE DOE (S) (1-100), individually and in her official capacity and ABC BUSINESS ENTITIES (1-10);
Defendants,
and
SOMERSET COUNTY, NJ; VERONICA NOLAN, individually and in her official capacity; ROBERT SMITH, individually and in his official capacity and STUART BUCKMAN, individually and in his official capacity;
Defendants-Appellants.
Argued April 30, 2001 -- Decided July 31, 2001
On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Somerset County.
Arthur S. Goldstein argued the cause for appellant Somerset County, NJ (Wolff & Samson, attorneys; Mr. Goldstein and Kenneth N. Laptook, of counsel; Andrew C. Samson
and Junie Hahn, on the briefs).
Larry R. Etzweiler, Senior Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Jeffrey J. Miller and Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel).
Sonya M. Longo submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of appellant Robert Smith (Budd Larner Gross Rosenbaum Greenberg & Sade, attorneys).
Steven L. Klepper submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of appellant Veronica Nolan (Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman & Leonard, attorneys).
Richard A. Norris on behalf of appellant Stuart Buckman relied upon the briefs submitted on behalf Somerset County, NJ (Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STEIN, J.
This is an interlocutory appeal arising from a civil action for false arrest, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and other causes of action against several defendants including thirteen employees of the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO). We must determine whether pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, the State of New Jersey is vicariously liable for the actions of the SCPO's employees and whether the State is required to indemnify and defend them. The trial court held that the State was neither vicariously liable for the SCPO's employees' conduct nor required to defend and indemnify them. The Appellate Division denied appellants' motions for interlocutory review.
We reverse. We hold that the State may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the SCPO's prosecutors and investigative subordinates during the investigation, arrest and prosecution of Isaac Wright and that the State may be required to indemnify and defend those prosecutors and subordinates in respect of the claims alleged by Wright in this litigation.
I
In 1989, the SCPO, along with other law enforcement agencies, conducted a lengthy investigation concerning plaintiff Isaac Wright's leadership of a drug distribution network extending throughout the counties of Somerset, Middlesex, and Passaic. That investigation culminated in July 1989, when Wright, as well as several of his co-conspirators, were arrested for numerous violations of the narcotics laws. In August 1989, Wright was indicted and charged with leading a narcotics trafficking network, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3; possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 5a(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(1), and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2); maintaining or operating a narcotics production facility, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4; and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2. State v. Wright, 143 N.J. 580, 581 (1996). In April 1991, following a trial, the jury found Wright guilty of all charges alleged against him in the indictment. Ibid. The trial court sentenced Wright to an aggregate term of life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. Ibid. In July 1991, Wright and his wife, Adriel McNair, filed a lawsuit alleging false arrest, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault and battery, loss of consortium, and other causes of action. The complaint also included allegations that defendants beat Wright at the time of his arrest, suborned perjury, and illegally searched his prison cell. The named defendants included, among others, Somerset County and its prosecutor's office, Middlesex County and its prosecutor's office, Passaic County and its prosecutor's office, Franklin Township and its police department, the City of Passaic and its police department, twenty past and present employees of prosecutors' offices, three municipal police officers, one municipal prosecutor, and the State of New Jersey. Wright alleged that former Somerset County Prosecutor Nicholas L. Bissell, Jr., and several employees of the SCPO including individual appellants Veronica Nolan (Assistant Prosecutor), Stuart Buckman (Detective), and Robert Smith (Deputy Chief of Detectives), among others, acted to effect his false arrest and to invade his privacy.
In 1995, in an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed all of Wright's convictions except the conviction for leading a narcotics trafficking network. See Wright, supra, 143 N.J. at 582. The Appellate Division determined that the jury instruction regarding Wright's drug-kingpin status was inadequate. Ibid. In 1996, this Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. Ibid. Wright subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief seeking to have his remaining convictions reversed, alleging prosecutorial and police misconduct throughout the investigation, arrest, grand jury proceedings, and trial. In December 1997, the Law Division reversed Wright's remaining convictions after an evidentiary hearing on Wright's petition for post-conviction relief. The court found that high-ranking Somerset County law-enforcement officials concealed evidence of the illegal search for and seizure of cocaine used at Wright's trial. The court also found that former Somerset County Prosecutor Bissell knew about, but concealed, the terms of a favorable plea agreement with one of the co-defendants who was a State's witness at Wright's trial. Following the court's decision, the indictment against Wright was dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiffs' initial civil complaint joined as defendants all of the appellants in this appeal with the exception of Veronica Nolan and the State of New Jersey, who both were joined in the second amended complaint. However, the second amended complaint was not served with a summons on the Attorney General as required by Rule 4:4-4(a)(7) for the institution of a civil lawsuit against the State. The State subsequently was joined as a defendant with the filing of plaintiffs' third amended complaint in August 1998, and the service of a summons on the State in November 1998.
In February 1997, prior to the State's joinder, appellant Somerset County sent the Attorney General a letter requesting representation and indemnification on behalf of the SCPO's employees whom Somerset County was then representing. The Attorney General declined Somerset County's request. In September and October of 1998, appellants Veronica Nolan, Stuart Buckman, and Robert Smith, as well as other defendants in the action including both prosecutorial employees and municipal police officers, filed cross-claims demanding that the State provide them with indemnification and legal representation, but none of those parties served the cross-claims on the State. In March 1999, the trial court ordered appellants and other cross- claiming defendants to serve their cross-claims on the State.
In a motion initially filed in February 1999, and in a supplemental motion filed in April 1999, the State moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' third amended complaint as well as all cross-claims demanding indemnification and representation. The appellants and other defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on their cross-claims against the State for vicarious liability, indemnification and defense costs.
In August 1999, the trial court issued an order holding that Somerset County was liable for defense and indemnification of the SCPO's employees. The court relied partly on an unpublished federal court opinion holding that Somerset County, and not the State, was responsible for legal fees incurred in defending a county prosecutor. The trial court held that Somerset County was collaterally estopped from seeking defense costs from the State because the same issue had been litigated in the federal court. The trial court also relied on Michaels v. State of New Jersey,
968 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 150 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that there was no authority to support finding that prosecutorial defendants are State employees within meaning of N.J.S.A. 59:10-1 and N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1), to conclude that the State was not required to defend and indemnify Somerset County and the SCPO employees.
The trial court did not decide the issue of vicarious liability, noting that discovery was not complete. However, the trial court indicated that its decision regarding that issue would depend on whether responsibility for the actions of SCPO employees was a function of administrative oversight, for which the county would be responsible, or a function of law enforcement duties, for which the State would be vicariously liable. Thus, the trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the issue of defense and indemnification, and denied the summary judgment motions of the State as well as Somerset County and the other counter-claimants with respect to the issue of vicarious liability.
Both Somerset County and the State moved for reconsideration of the trial court's August 1999 decision. In January 2000, the trial court issued its interlocutory opinion and order responding to appellant Somerset County's reconsideration motion. The trial court denied Somerset County's request for reconsideration. In the statement of reasons attached to the order, the trial court reiterated its earlier determination that the incompleteness of discovery precluded it from deciding the vicarious liability issue. Regarding the issue of indemnification and defense costs the trial court amended the language of the August 1999 order to read as follows: Since a prosecutor's office is not a public entity capable of being sued, and having concluded that the State is not obligated for these costs, payment of these costs must be resolved between the county and its prosecutorial employees.
In February 2000, the trial court issued its interlocutory opinion and order granting summary judgment to the State on all claims that it was vicariously liable for the acts of the county prosecutors or their employees. The trial court stated that [w]hile the State may have supervisory powers over the county prosecutors' offices, no statute or case law directly imposed economic obligations on the State for these offices. The trial court also stated that it was satisfied that any public entity obligation for a county prosecutor's office, including for vicarious liability for negligent acts in carrying out law enforcement duties, should not be imposed on the State. Thus, the trial court ruled in favor of the State on the issue of vicarious liability and dismissed the remaining counts of the third amended complaint.
According to the State, Somerset County, as well as all the individual appellants, except Stuart Buckman, sought interlocutory review and reversal of the Law Division's January 2000 order. In addition, appellants Somerset County, Robert Smith, and Stuart Buckman sought interlocutory review and reversal of the Law Division's February 2000 order granting the State summary judgment with respect to vicarious liability for the employees of the SCPO. Appellant Veronica Nolan did not seek review of that issue.
In April 2000, the Appellate Division denied interlocutory review of both orders. Each appellant, Somerset County, Veronica Nolan, Stuart Buckman, and Robert Smith, filed a motion in this Court seeking reversal of each Appellate Division order denying interlocutory review. In December 2000 we granted those motions for interlocutory review.
II
A
A threshold issue in this appeal is whether the State should be held vicariously liable for the alleged tortious conduct of the SCPO's employees during the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Isaac Wright. The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq., effective July 1, 1972, is dispositive, with respect to causes of action in tort accruing on and after that date, of the nature, extent and scope of state and local tort liability and the procedural requisites for prosecuting tort claims against governmental agencies. Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 17.1 on R. 4:5-4 (2001). Thus, this case is governed by the TCA. N.J.S.A. 59:1-2. The provision relevant to the issue of the vicarious liability of a public entity provides: A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a). The TCA defines [p]ublic entity as including the State, and any county, municipality, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public body in the State. N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. It defines [p]ublic employee as an employee of a public entity, and an employee as includ[ing] an officer, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated or part-time, who is authorized to perform any act or service; provided however, that the term does not include an independent contractor. Ibid. The comment to N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a) reads in pertinent part:
The primary source of public entity liability is contained in subsection (a) of this section. It establishes the principle of vicarious liability for all public entities for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment and thereby relies upon the established principles of law such as the doctrine of respondeat superior. This provision specifically adopts the general concept of vicarious liability expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172,
162 A.2d 820 (1960).
https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2001/a-54-00-opn.html
